Investigating the Potential of Fee-Based Recreation on Private Lands in the Lower Mississippi River Delta by Henderson, James E. & Dunn, Michael A.
Investigating the Potential of Fee-Based Recreation on Private Lands in the Lower 
Mississippi River Delta 
 
 
James E. Henderson, Graduate Assistant 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 
101 Agricultural Administration Building, Louisiana State University 




Michael A. Dunn, Associate Professor 
Dept. of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 
101 Agricultural Administration Bldg., Louisiana State University 




Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the  
Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings 
Mobile, Alabama, February 3-6, 2007 
 
Copyright 2007 by James E. Henderson and Michael A. Dunn.  All rights reserved. Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such properties.   
 
Abstract 
Private landowners may be willing to allow public access for fee-based wildlife-associated 
recreation.  A survey and econometric techniques are proposed to determine what characteristics 
may influence the probability to decide to offer recreation, what organizational form landowners 
may prefer to manage and market fee-based recreation, and how liability concerns and other 
possible disincentives collectively influence landowners’ access decisions. 
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Introduction and Background 
  The Lower Mississippi Valley or Delta, which encompasses parts of Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi, has been dominated by agriculture over the better part of two 
centuries.  However, there are a number of factors, such as increasing demand for 
environmental amenities and downward price pressure from growing world trade of 
agricultural commodities, which may entice agricultural landowners to consider other 
land uses for some acreage in the delta, particularly for marginal lands.  Problems with 
agricultural profitability and increasing demand for recreational sites may encourage 
some landowners to consider alternative sources of income, such as commercially 
developing wildlife, fish and habitat resources, and charging for recreational access 
(Schenck et al., 1987; Thomas et al., 1989).  Marginal agricultural land is land that will 
produce barely enough products to pay the cost of production (Ise, 1940).  Removing 
marginal farm lands from agricultural applications has been encouraged by the U.S. 
Federal Government through incentive programs such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program, Grassland Reserve Program, and the Wetland Reserve Program (2002 Farm 
Bill). Many of these lands are not utilized in a productive capacity that would contribute 
to the local economy.   
  Recreational hunting, fishing, and wildlife watching opportunities on private land 
for public use may be a possible way to provide income to landowners and restore 
marginal lands as a contributor to the local economy.  Additionally, such an enterprise 
can draw recreationists from outside the local economy benefiting local business.  
According to the 2001 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife Associated 
  1Recreation, expenditures on wildlife-associated recreation by state residents and 
nonresidents in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi amounted to$1.3 billion, $1.5 
billion, and $974 million, respectively.  Clearly, the ability to attract recreationists could 
benefit small local economies in the Delta region.  The 2001 survey also revealed that the 
number of residents and nonresidents that fished, hunted, or watched wildlife was 1.4 
million in Arkansas, nearly 1.6 million in Louisiana, and was more than 1 million in 
Mississippi.  However, the amount of public land available for recreation is limited.  
There are approximately 746 million acres of public land in the United States; yet, the 
vast majority of the public land is in the western United States (Copeland, 1998) This is 
problematic for public outdoor recreation, particularly in the eastern United States where 
there is only 9 percent of the nation’s public land and 78 percent of the population 
(Langer, 1989).   It has long been recognized that the solution to the lack of public land 
for recreation is increasing access to private lands for public outdoor recreation 
(Copeland, 1998; Wright et al., 2002) 
Given that the outlook for outdoor recreation is an ever increasing demand with 
no or limited change in the amount of public land, private land must become more 
available if the supply of recreational opportunities is to meet demand (Langer, 1989). 
Even though wildlife is held in trust by individual state governments, the access to enjoy 
wildlife is a clear right of control that is exercised by the landowner.   Landowners 
control the wildlife habitat granting them de facto control over wildlife (Benson, 2001).  
Marion (1989) noted that there is a trend toward reduction in free public access to private 
lands for recreation and suggested that this was due to increasing urbanization, a growing 
number of recreationists, increasing property damage resulting from trespassers, and the 
  2recognition on the part of landowners that providing access to private land for recreation 
can generate income.  Leopold (1930) recommended that the private landowner should be 
encouraged to pursue potential profits from access fees since this would ultimately 
benefit wildlife by promoting wildlife habitat management on private land.   
  Given the demand for outdoor recreation and the limited availability of public land, 
the potential may exist for private landowners in rural areas to develop fee-based 
recreational access on private land. What form of wildlife based recreational enterprise 
would or do landowners prefer?  There are several options.  Landowners can operate 
individually, cooperatively with other landowners, or contract management to an outfitter 
that can serve as a broker between landowners and recreationists.   
Objectives 
  The primary objective of this study is to understand the attitudes and perceptions 
of landowners in the Lower Mississippi River Delta regarding 1) fee-based wildlife-
associated recreation, 2) to determine what management organizational form landowners 
prefer to manage and market fee-based recreation: independent, cooperative, or outfitter, 
and 3) how liability concerns and other possible disincentives collectively influence 
landowners’ access decisions.  Using a survey and econometric techniques, the study will 
seek to identify landowner characteristics that may have a positive effect on a 
landowner’s probability of choosing to offer fee-based recreation and the choice of 
organizational form to manage and market fee-based recreation. 
Fee-Based Recreation and Landowners 
  Landowners that prefer to manage fee-based recreation may choose to lease their 
lands to an individual hunter or group of hunters for a specified period of time such as 
  3hunting season or year, or offer permit hunting where land access is granted for a day in 
exchange for a fee.  Recreational leasing may not be practical for some landowners since 
wildlife habitat management on private land is often limited by tract size (Hrivnak, 
1995).   
  Seymour (1985) discussed the concept of resource-controlled recreation 
cooperatives that develop and market recreational opportunities.  Cooperation among 
local landowners allows for improved wildlife habitat management by increasing the 
manageable land area (Benson et al., 1999).  This cooperation could also be extended to 
marketing and management of fee-based recreation.  Using a cooperative management 
model would allow landowners to collectively engage in a fee-based recreational 
enterprise that could result in economies of both scale and scope.   The concept of using 
landowner cooperatives for natural resource management and marketing over traditional 
forms of business organization of proprietorship, partnership, and corporations was 
advanced by Yarrow (1989).  Advantages of landowner cooperatives for wildlife and 
timber include formation of a larger manageable land base, increased recreational 
opportunities for the public, increased income to landowners, greater awareness of the 
value of wildlife, and increased investment in wildlife habitat management on private 
lands.  Disadvantages of landowner cooperatives are inability of landowners to agree on 
objectives and the efforts required for landowners to coordinate management activities. 
Yarrow (1989) concluded that the cooperative approach may not be applicable where 
there is insufficient interest, interest and objectives of landowners conflict, there is local 
resistance, and individual tracts of land are large enough for individual management.   
  4  A third option that landowners may prefer is the use of outfitters which can serve as 
intermediaries between recreationists and landowners.  Sun et al. (2005) in a study of 
hunting outfitters operating in Mississippi found that nearly half of their land base was 
leased from other landowners.  Payment to landowners by outfitters is generally either an 
annual fee or a percentage of the outfitter’s gross revenue.  
Landowner Liability  
  Generating additional income for landowners by allowing recreational activities 
brings with it the possibility of legal action as landowners may be sued if bodily injury 
results to a recreational user of the property (Copeland, 1998).  If a recreationist is injured 
will on private property it is possible that a lawsuit may be filed by the injured party 
against the landowner.   The level of duty owed by the landowner to the injured party 
depends on whether the person enters the premises as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee 
(Copeland, 1998).  “An invitee is one who enters the premises upon business which 
concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation express or implied, the latter is under an 
affirmative duty to protect them, a licensee is one who has permission to enter upon the 
land of another, but comes for his own purposes rather than for any purpose or interest of 
the possessor of the land, and a trespasser is one who enters or remains upon land in the 
possession of another without a privilege to do so, created by the possessor’s consent or 
otherwise.” (Direnfeld-Michael, 1987).  A recreationist that is allowed access to private 
property by the landowner for free is a license, but if a fee is charged by the landowner 
then the recreationist is considered to be an invitee (Copeland, 1998).  A landowner who 
charges a fee for the recreational use of his or her property owes special legal duties to 
the invitee, since the invitee enters the land under the implied representation that 
  5reasonable care has been taken by the landowner to make the property safe for 
recreational use (Copeland, 1998). 
  The need for greater access to private land for public recreation and the concern 
that private landowners have over liability was recognized by the Council of State 
Governments and addressed when they drafted a model Recreational Uses Statute in 1965 
(Kozlowski and Wright, 1989).  The idea behind the model act was if landowners were 
protected from liability more landowners would allow recreational use of their property 
which would reduce the need and expense to state governments to provide recreation 
areas to the public (Wright et al., 2002).  State legislatures have passed recreational use 
statutes designed to encourage landowners to open up their lands to the public promising 
private landowners immunity from lawsuits over accidental injury to recreational users 
while on a landowner’s property (Copeland, 1998).  Most state recreational use statutes 
insulate landowners from liability if access is granted without a charge. However, there 
are an increasing number of states allowing landowners to charge a fee and retain the 
liability protection (Wright, 1989; Wright et al., 2002).  Today all 50 states have adopted 
recreational use statutes that are intended to encourage landowners to make their lands 
available for public recreational use by providing greater liability protection to the 
landowner (Wright et al., 2002).   
     However, liability issues or at least perceived liability continue to be a major 
concern to landowners.  Ruff and Isaac (1987) noted that one of the primary reasons why 
woodland owners in Wisconsin owning 20 acres or more do not lease their land for 
hunting was fear of personal injury lawsuit, and only 3 percent of Wisconsin’s 
landowners actually leased land for hunting.  This is interesting considering that 
  6Wisconsin’s recreational use statute (Wisc. Stat. § 895.52) allows property owners to 
collect fees for recreational activities not exceeding a total of $2,000 each year.  This may 
indicate that landowners are not aware of the liability protections afforded to them by 
state recreational uses statutes.  Marion (1989) noted that liability remains to be a major 
area of confusion on the part of landowners.  Kaiser and Wright (1985) reported that 
recreational use statutes have been “splendidly ineffective” in increasing public access to 
private lands.   Owen et al. (1885) surveyed private forest landowners in Arkansas 
owning more than 1,000 acres about public use policies.  Owen et al. (1885) reported that 
hunting was the most common public use of private land; however, several of the survey 
respondents expressed concern about user liability.  The authors pointed to a 1965 code 
amended in 1983 and noted that the state law provides liability protection.  Owen et al. 
(1885) concluded that much of the remaining fear expressed by landowners may be more 
perceived than real.  Heberlein and Davis (1987) in their study of hunter participation and 
fee access hunting recognized the importance and need for further research in the area of 
institutional issues associated with fee hunting that included legal liability for 
landowners. 
  Even with the extensive liability protection afforded to landowners by state 
recreational uses statutes, there remains a significant gap between landowners’ 
perceptions regarding liability and the reality of liability (Wright et al., 2002).  In their 
survey of recreation use statutes Wright et al. (2002) observed that researchers have 
clearly identified that landowners are concerned about liability but have only documented 
that it is perceived as a problem.  Wright et al. (2002) indicated that a better 
understanding is needed of how liability and various other disincentives collectively 
  7influence landowners’ access decisions.  Mozumder et al. (2004) suggested that the 
necessary institutions for hunters and landowners may not be in place to promote 
recreational leasing, and that institutional changes that facilitate more exchanges would 
shift the supply curve outward.  The effects of institutional change on landowner leasing 
behavior can be explored by asking if landowners would allow recreational access and/or 
leasing if liability was limited by state law.  Recreational uses statutes for Louisiana (La. 
R.S. § 9:2791) and Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. § 89-2-1) do not extend liability 
protection if a fee is charged for access; however, Arkansas (A.C.A.§ 18-11-301) allows 
for the charging of an access fee as long as the fee is used to offset costs only.  It would 
be interesting to see how landowner leasing policies would change by expanding the 
liability protection of recreational uses statutes to allow for the charging of a fee intended 
to generate a return to the landowner.  Investigating the effect of such an institutional 
change can provided insight into landowner leasing behavior and possible effects on the 
supply of available recreational land.   
Contingent Valuation of Lease and Fee Recreation 
Landowners that are currently leasing land or allowing some form of permit based 
access can be surveyed to determine lease values directly.  However, the level of 
incentives needed by landowners not leasing land can not be assessed by looking only at 
revealed preference (i.e., existing lease prices).  Contingent valuation can be used to 
assess landowners’ perceived values for recreational leasing.  The contingent valuation 
method is a simple nonmarket valuation technique that was originally proposed by 
Ciriancy-Wantrup (1947), who suggested that the prevention of soil erosion generated an 
extra market benefit to the public that could be valued by eliciting individual’s 
  8willingness to pay.  The first empirical use of contingent valuation was Davis (1963) in 
estimating willingness to pay of goose hunters.  Contingent valuation method has since 
been used widely and for a variety of non-market applications (Venkatachalam, 2004).   
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) convened a 
panel of experts to access the reliability of the contingent valuation method following 
criticisms of the government’s use of the method in the wake of the Exxon Valdez 
disaster.  A summary of the NOAA panel report (Arrow et al., 1993) findings and 
recommendations can be found in Randall (1997) and in Bishop (1998).  The panel 
concluded that continent valuation studies convey useful information for judicial and 
administrative decisions provided they are carefully designed and implanted (Loomis, 
1999).  The report conveyed to some that all contingent valuation studies need to adhere 
to the set of standards they proposed, which has had a negative impact on contingent 
valuation studies due to the higher cost of attaining these standards (Loomis, 1999; 
Carson, et al., 2001).   
The four common elicitation techniques used in contingent valuation studies 
include the bidding game, payment card, open-ended, and dichotomous choice approach 
(Boyle et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 2004).  All of these approaches have certain 
drawbacks.  The bidding game approach is often criticized for starting point bias that can 
influence the respondent’s stated willingness to pay.  The starting point initiates the 
bidding process, and a bias exists when the initial bid, as stated by the interviewer, affects 
the finial bid of the respondent (Bishop and Heberlein, 1990).  The payment card 
approach, proposed by Mitchell and Carson (1981), presents a range of values for the 
respondent to choose their maximum willingness to pay, yet the approach may be 
  9affected by range and centering bias.  Range bias can occur when the payment card range 
is too large or too small affecting the willingness to pay mean and standard deviation, and 
centering bias results when respondents exhibit a tendency to pick the middle value 
(Gardner et al., 2003).  An alternative that avoids the biases previously described is the 
open-ended approach where the respondent is asked for their maximum willingness to 
pay value.  However, the open end approach is subject to protest bids and higher non-
responses.  Protest bids include both zero bids and positive bids that represent outliers in 
the distribution of responses (Jorgensen, et al., 1999).  The dichotomous choice or 
referendum style presents the respondent with a single bid value that they can either 
accept or reject.  The dichotomous choice approach has been modified to double bounded 
and multiple bounded elicitation formats (Welsh and Poe, 1998).  
Open-ended contingent valuation questions can be appropriate if the respondent is 
familiar the good being valued and has a reasonable understanding of its value.  Kealy 
and Turner (1993) found that there was no statistical difference between results derived 
from open-ended and dichotomous choice questions for a private good but there was a 
significant difference in the case of a public good.  Mitchell and Carson (1989) found that 
open-ended questions work well in situations where respondents are familiar with paying 
for the good.  Ultimately, the choice of elicitation technique in a contingent valuation 
study depends on the nature of the good being values, survey cost, statistical technique 
used, and the nature of the survey respondents (Venkatachalam, 2004). 
  The contingent valuation method has been used to assess the willingness to pay for 
hunting oppurtunities (Goodwin et al., 1993; Adams et al., 1989; Berrens and Adams, 
1989; Fried et al., 1995; Hussain et al., 2004).  Most studies of leasing of private lands for 
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1989; Schenck; 1987; Owen et al., 1985, Jones et al., 2005).  Mozumder et al. (2004) 
lamented there was not yet enough empirical studies that estimate hunters’ willingness to 
pay for private hunting lease or landowners’ willingness to accept compensation to 
allowing hunting.  Wright et al. (2002) recommended that contingent valuation methods 
be used to determine the level of incentives required by landowners to overcome 
disincentives to leasing land for public recreational access (Wright et al., 2002).  Also, 
disincentives both perceived and real can be explored, which may indicate a need 
landowner education about liability and recreation that could improve public access to 
private lands.  For example, if landowners were better informed about liability and the 
income potential of fee-based recreation the amount of private land available for public 
recreation may increase.  This would benefit the public seeking recreational 
opportunities, private landowners seeking additional income, and local economies by the 
expenditures of out of area recreationists.  
Using an open-ended style contingent valuation question to assess landowner 
valuation of leasing should produce acceptable results.  However, in the case of absentee 
landowners or passive landowners the results may not be as acceptable since some 
landowners may be less familiar with the revenue generating potential of their land.  
Alternatively, farmers and other non-passive landowners should have a greater awareness 
of their land’s ability to generate revenue.  Given that some landowners may not be that 
familiar with land value or revenue generating potential of their land, a dichotomous 
choice or referendum style contingent valuation question may be more appropriate.  The 
dichotomous choice technique randomly assigns each respondent a specific dollar amount 
  11and asks them whether or not they would be willing to accept that amount (Bishop and 
Heberlein, 1990).  The multiple bounded dichotomous choice approach developed by 
Welsh and Poe (1998) could be used to present a range of lease values per acre.  Conway 
(2002) used a multiple bounded dichotomous choice approach to estimate forest 
landowners’ willingness to accept value to enter the timber market.  This approach 
presents willingness to accept values in a referendum style that allows the respondent to 
make a yes/no choice.  Additionally, the decision certainty can be assed for each 
willingness to accept value as respondents are asked to indicate their certainty for 
accepting each value by indicating definitely no, probably no, not sure, probably yes, or 
definitely yes.         
Data and Methods   
  A survey instrument will be used to elicit the attitudes and perceptions of Delta 
landowners regarding the potential for allowing fee-based recreational access.  Through 
the survey instrument the landowners will be questioned on topics including: current land 
uses, knowledge and experience with cooperative management and recreation, experience 
with leasing land, liability concerns and awareness, and demographic information.     
  The basic decision model for landowners has two parts.  The first part is whether 
the landowner is willing to offer fee-based recreation to the public.  The second part 
seeks to determine if they prefer to offer recreation independently or in coordination with 
other landowners.  A qualitative choice model can allow for an understanding of which 
landowner characteristics influence the probability to decide to offer recreation to the 
public and how landowners would prefer to offer it, either independently or cooperatively 
(Greene, 2003).  
  12   The two dependent variables in this model are both binary.  The first dependent 
variable represents the decision to offer fee-based recreation (Y1=1, 0 otherwise), and the 
second dependent variable represents the subsequent decision to use a recreational 
management association (Y2=1, 0 otherwise).  The second dependent variable is 
censored, which presents an additional complication for estimation.  This can be 
addressed by using a bivariate probit model with sample selection that accounts for 
censoring and provides unbiased parameter estimates (Greene, 2003).  
  Survey response to the open-ended willingness to accept questions as a dependent 
variable will be modeled as a function of independent variables representing landowner 
attributes and land uses.  This data will also be censored since some respondents may 
choose not to allow recreational access, so the regression analysis will utilize a Tobit 
censored regression model (Greene, 2003).  Responses to the multiple bounded 
dichotomous choice willingness to accept question can be analyzed using multinomial 
logit models to examine the effect of relevant explanatory variables on each level of 
willingness to accept decision certainty.  Also, a binomial logit model can be used to 
examine how the yes or no decision to allow public access is influenced by lease value as 
indicated by willingness to accept. 
Expected Results 
  The regression results will be used to identify landowner characteristics that have a 
positive effect on a landowner’s probability of choosing to offer fee-based recreation.  
Once model estimation is complete, the sign of various explanatory variables will 
indicate how land characteristics and landowner demographics may influence the 
probability to choose to offer wildlife-associated recreation and how to offer it: 
  13independently, cooperatively, or through an outfitter.  Also the effects of liability and 
liability perceptions on landowner access decisions and the possible effect of institutional 
change can be identified.   
Discussion 
  The results of this study will provide insights into the willingness of landowners in 
the Lower Mississippi River Delta to 1) offer wildlife-associated recreation on otherwise 
unused or marginal farms lands, 2) to cooperate with other landowners to maximize 
wildlife habitat, 3) to use a coordinated management business model to manage and 
market fee-based recreation on private land, 4) identify possible opportunities for 
outfitters to lease land in the Delta, and 5) identify how liability concerns factor into 
landowner access decisions and how institutional change may facilitate public 
recreational access to private land.   
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